Gyu Sang Shim

Professional Preparation

PhD - Political Science
University of Rochester - 2022

MA - Political Science
University of Rochester - 2020

MA - Political Science
Purdue University - 2017

MS - Economics
Purdue University - 2017

BA - Political Science
Konkuk University, Seoul - 2012

Research Areas

International Political Economy

Foreign Direct Investment

Economic Development

Global Supply Chain

Geoeconomics

Publications

Chapter 14: Analysis of Discourses from Foreign Experts Opposing South Korea’s Nuclear Self-Reliance 2025 - Book Chapter

Chapter 15: Analysis of Discourses from Foreign Experts Supporting South Korea’s Nuclear Self-Reliance 2025 - Book Chapter

Chapter 23: Assessment of South Korean Public Opinion on Independent Nuclear Armament 2025 - Book Chapter

Human Security in Northeast Asia : Searching for Regional Cooperation 2023 - Journal Article

Heterogeneity in How Investors Respond to Disputes: Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment and Coindustrial Disputes 2021 - Journal Article

The Effect of Norm Dynamics on the Relationship between Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Regulation 2019 - Journal Article

Preventive Restriction of FDI Outflow 2018 - Journal Article

Appointments

Assistant Professor
The University of Texas at Dallas [2025–Present]

Instructional Assistant Professor
The Bush School DC, Texas A&M University [2022–2025]

Projects

Armed Conflict and the Location of Extractive FDI

Despite the link between resource wealth and conflict, some mining regions experience intense violence while others remain relatively peaceful. This paper argues that foreign ownership of mines restrains armed conflict near mining facilities. The potential for intervention by the home governments of foreign miners discourages rebel attacks. Using a staggered difference-in-differences design with georeferenced conflict and mining facility data from 1998 to 2010, the analysis shows a reduction in armed conflict following the entry of foreign miners. The military expenditure of the foreign miner’s home country further strengthens this restraining effect, highlighting the protective role of foreign ownership.

Why did they leave South Korea? - Study on the problem of North Korean defectors’ departure from South Korea

The present study explores the motivations behind secondary migration from South Korea by North Korean defectors, despite the shared ethnicity and language. The present study introduces the "salience gap" framework, a concept derived from the analysis of interviews conducted with twenty defectors and the application of Bayesian modelling. This framework elucidates the discrepancy between an individual's initial motivations for defecting and their subsequent experiences during resettlement. The political motivations of defectors are indicative of their allegiance towards liberal-democratic destinations, such as the US, and economically motivated defectors demonstrate a preference for welfare-oriented societies, exemplified by the UK. However, when experiences do not align with motivations, destination choices are subject to reversal. These findings reconceptualize secondary migration as strategic recalibration rather than integration failure, thus offering novel insights for refugee policy and mobility theory.

Foreign Agents: MNCs and WTO Disputes

Foreign firms play an important role in lobbying the US government for free trade. Their importance has risen along with foreign investment in the United States, which increases their stakes in US policies, and along with the rise in the number of foreign firms in the top ranks of multinationals. They lobby Congress and the White House in addition to
USTR, the State Department, the Commerce Department, and a variety of other agencies, and they lobby about trade as well as many other policies. Lobbying responds as trade disputes increase or decrease its expected payoff in ways that are consistent with an informational theory of lobbying. Foreign rms face a liability of foreignness that reduces their
incentives to lobby. As a result, rms with US aliates respond more strongly to disputes if their home countries are closely aligned with the United States. Anti-dumping disputes generate distinct sets of incentives and patterns of lobbying.

Corporate Lobbying and Investor-State Disputes

Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions have become key components in international investment treaties in protecting foreign direct investments (FDI). Although occurrences of ISDS are rare compared to the number of FDI transactions, some firms experience ISDS more frequently than the others. This study builds a game theoretic model to investigate the effect of lobbying disclosure on the pattern of ISDS and test the theory using firm-level data of Global Fortune 500 firms' lobbying and ISDS between 2000 and 2015. A firm's lobbying activity signals political influence with the US government to host governments. Host governments perceive the US intervention during an ISDS proceeding to be costly, so they adjust their policies to avoid disputes when lobbying information is available. However, firms with large lobbying efforts have an incentive to use ISDS as bargaining leverage against host governments' regulatory ambition, and their political connection is often known to host governments. Therefore, the lobbying disclosure act makes lobbying firms experience fewer ISDS, while this effect is attenuated as the volume of lobbying efforts increases. This paper exploits the exogenous shock of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, changing the ability of host governments to identify politically influential firms. In accordance with the theoretical expectations, the findings of this paper demonstrate how lobbying disclosure changes the number of ISDS along with corporate lobbying efforts.

Navigating Uncertainty: Signaling, Compliance, and Learning in CFIUS Reviews of Cross-Border Deals

This article examines when firms voluntarily submit their cross-border mergers or acquisitions for national security review in the United States. Governments are increasingly using investment screening mechanisms to advance national security priorities. However, firms’ compliance with such regulations is not automatically guaranteed, given that these reviews are costly and may result in the government blocking the transaction. We investigate this compliance question by developing a game-theoretical model in which firms can learn what kinds of transactions are most likely to create actionable risks for the government. Using novel data on CFIUS filings, we find that (1) firms learn from their co-industrialists and co-nationals and tend to file a notice when the risk of review is high; and (2) when the government’s beliefs about national security risks are unstable, firms are more likely to over-comply by submitting low-risk transactions for review. Our findings speak to broader theoretical debates about information transmission between government regulators and firms under uncertainty; regulatory compliance and optimal design; and the balance between state and corporate power amid the rise of national security– and geopolitical-based regulations.